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When is a Hack not a Hack: Addressing the
CFAA's Applicability to the Internet Service
Context
Laura Bernescut

INTRODUCTION
Pew Research Center findings show that as of June 2012
approximately "[t]hree quarters ... of Americans own either a
desktop or laptop computer,"' while nearly nine out of every ten
Americans own a cellphone. 2 And more than half of cellphone
owners use their cellphones to access the Internet. 3 Along with
such widespread Internet usage, typical consumers now also use
a wider variety of Internet services on a daily basis, including
online networking websites. 4 Yet the legal issues potentially
facing users of these Internet services continue to emerge and
develop almost as fluidly as the world of social media itself.5
Though the market has quickly adapted to the needs of the
public, with new networking websites constantly popping up and

t BA 2011, Tufts University School of Arts and Sciences; JD Candidate 2014, The
University of Chicago Law School.
' Aaron Smith, Americans and Their Gadgets, 2 (Pew Research Center Oct 14,
2010), online at http://pewinternet.org/-/medial/Files/Reports/2010/PIP-Americans%20
and%20their%2OGadgets.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013) (concluding that 76 percent of
Americans own either a desktop or laptop computer).
2 Aaron Smith, Cell Internet Use 2012, 2 (Pew Research Center June 26, 2012),
online
at
http://www.pewinternet.org/-/medial/Files/Reports/2012/PIP Cell Phone_
InternetAccess.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013).
3 Id.
For statistics about the increased use of social networking services, see Deirdre
Bannon, State of the Media: The Social Media Report 2012, 2 (The Nielsen Company Dec
4, 2012),
online
at http://www.nielsen.com/content/dam/corporate/us/en/reportsdownloads/2012-Reports/The-Social-Media-Report-2012.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013)
(describing the phenomenal growth of social media over the past two decades, its
continual expansion, and the integral role it plays in everyday life).
" See generally Rick Biagi, Dan Schaeffer, and Jeremy Roe, Top 10 Legal Issues in
Social Media, (Neal & McDevitt LLC 2010), online at http://www.bartonchicago.com/pdf/
socialmedia.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013).
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providing users with opportunities to connect with like-minded
individuals, 6 the law has been slow to anticipate and respond to
the legal issues introduced by the proliferation of such Internet
services. 7 Accordingly, courts are being asked to consider the
scope of legal implications related to the use of networking
websites and other Internet services.8 When it comes to the
misuse of these websites in ways prohibited by the Terms of
Service or other registration agreements, the federal law
potentially applicable to these issues is the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act ("CFAA"),9 which governs "fraud and related activity
in connection with computers."10 Yet the CFAA is almost twenty
years older than the social networking giant Facebook, the
online dating services eHarmony and Match.com, and the
professional networking website LinkedIn.1" Considering the
large generational gap between the enactment of the CFAA and
the Internet services it governs, along with the fact that the Act
has not been amended since 200812 (a time period during which
the existence and breadth of Internet services has grown in
See, for example, Bannon, State of the Media: The Social Media Report 2012 at 2
(cited in note 4) ("The number of social media networks consumers can choose from has
exploded, and too many sites to count are adding social features or integration.")
For a discussion of some of the legal issues arising from the use of social
networking sites, see generally Sharon Nelson, John Simek, and Jason Foltin, The Legal
Implications of Social Networking, 22 Regent U L Rev 1 (2009). See also Fernando M.
Pinguelo and Bradford W. Muller, Virtual Crimes, Real Damages: A Primer On
Cybercrimes In The United States and Efforts to Combat Cybercriminals, 16 Va J L &
Tech 116, 188 (2011) (noting that "[law enforcement] in the cyber realm . . . has been
largely reactive in nature") (citation omitted).
" See, for example, PhoneDog v Kravitz, 2012 WL 273323 *1 (ND Cal) (lawsuit over
ownership and use of work related Twitter account).
9 18 USC § 1030. Section 1030 was originally enacted in 1984. See Counterfeit
Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat
2190 (1984) ("Counterfeit Access Act of 1984").
1o 18 USC § 1030.
6

" The CFAA was officially established in enacted in 1986. Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act of 1986, Pub L No 99-474, 100 Stat 1213 (1986). Facebook was created
throughout late 2003 and early 2004. Nicholas Carlson, At Last - The Full Story of How
Facebook
Was
Founded (Business
Insider
Mar
5,
2010) online
at
http: Iwww.businessinsider.com/how-facebook-was-founded-2010-3#
(visited Sept 15,
2013) (dating the creation of Facebook to December 2003). According to its website,
eHarmony's creation dates back to 2000. http://www.eharmony.com/about/eharmony/
(visited Sept 15, 2013). Match.com launched in 1995. http://www.match.com/help/
aboutus.aspx?1id=4 (visited Sept 15, 2013). And LinkedIn was officially launched in
2003. http://www.linkedin.com/about-us (visited Sept 15, 2013).
12 Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act, 94
Minn L Rev 1561, 1569 (2010) ("The most recent expansions to [the CFAA] were enacted
in September 2008.").
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leaps and bounds), it is evident that consumers, businesses, and
legal professionals face uncertainty as to the legal consequences
arising from the use of these websites and of other Internet
services. And because the CFAA's current language is broad
enough to "potentially regulate[] every use of every computer in
the United States and even many millions of computers
abroad," 13 this uncertainty is not insignificant. As a result of this
unsettled landscape, the practical reality for consumers is that
little guidance exists in determining what may or may not be
punishable misuse of Internet services; therefore, as consumers
we must all tread cautiously and lightly whenever we click the
"I Accept" button.
One source of uncertainty for consumers regarding the role
of the CFAA in the Internet services context is that the meaning
of the CFAA's language is unsettled. The CFAA establishes
liability for access to computers and computer-based systems
that is "without authorization" or that "exceeds authorized
access." 14 But from those two seemingly straightforward
phrases, two significant legal disputes have arisen. First,
several courts have attempted to distinguish between the two
types of prohibited access-unauthorized access and excessive
access-but have arrived at starkly different results that
disagree not only about the meanings of the two phrases but
also about the types of activities that may be considered
unlawful under the CFAA.1 5 Second, a genuine circuit split
exists over the meaning of the phrase "exceeds authorized
access."16
An additional wrinkle in the consumer/Internet services
context is the fact that most of the "exceeds authorized access"
litigation has been brought in the employment context, where an
employer has sued a former employee for using the employer's
data to start a competing business. As a result, much of the
"exceeds authorized access" jurisprudence is nuanced by the
common law of employer-employee relationships,1 7 rendering it
13

Id at 1561.

14

See 18 USC § 1030(a).

's Compare InternationalAirport Centers, LLC v Citrin, 440 F3d 418 (7th Cir 2006),

with LVRC Holdings, LLC v Brekka, 581 F3d 1127 (9th Cir 2009).
16 Contrast United States v John, 597 F3d 263 (5th Cir 2010) and United States v
Rodriguez, 628 F3d 1258 (11th Cir 2010), with LVRC Holdings, LLC v Brekka, 581 F3d
1127 (9th Cir 2009) and United States v Nosal, 676 F3d 854 (9th Cir 2012).
17 See, for example, Citria, 440 F3d at 420-21 (defining an employee's CFAA
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less than fully useful in the consumer context. Thus not only is
the meaning of the language of the CFAA disputed among
circuits, but many of the precedents and their reasoning are
inapposite in the context of consumer usage of Internet services.
Lastly, at least one scholar has suggested that the CFAA
has no applicability outside of the employment context because
of the operation of the "void for vagueness" doctrine.1 8 According
to Professor Orin Kerr, the use of the CFAA in the Internet
services context is constitutionally deficient because it neither
affords consumers with adequate notice, nor provides law
enforcement with clear guidelines for enforceability. 19
Against that web of complexity, this Comment proposes a
comprehensive resolution: by examining the legislative history
of the CFAA and analyzing the existing CFAA case law, the
Comment argues that the current language of the CFAA can be
applied in the consumer Internet services context without
creating an overly broad or unreasonably vague criminal
statute. Specifically, this Comment takes the position that there
is an interpretation of the phrase "exceeds authorized access"
that is applicable to intentionally errant access to membershiprequired, Internet networking sites that have clear, well-defined
Terms of Service. That interpretation of "exceeds authorized
access" is consistent with the legislative history and the purpose
of the CFAA and abides by the limitations imposed by the void
for vagueness doctrine.
Part I of this Comment elaborates on the background of the
CFAA from its initial enactment to its subsequent amendments.
Part II presents the relevant case law, addressing both the
struggle over differentiating "without authorization" and
"exceeds authorized access," and the "exceeds authorized access"
circuit split. Part III discusses the more recent applications of
the CFAA to the Internet services context. Part IV analyzes the
viability of the different CFAA approaches in the Internet
services context, and Part V proposes limiting principles to
ensure that the CFAA can withstand void for vagueness
challenges in the Internet service context. Finally, Part VI
liability in terms of the duty of loyalty owed by the employee as the employer's agent).
"' See generally Kerr, 94 Minn L Rev 1561 (cited in note 12). The void for vagueness
doctrine requires that courts define laws both clearly and narrowly so as to provide
notice to the public of what behavior is potentially punishable and to ensure that law
enforcement is constrained from imposing laws discriminately. Id at 1575.
19

Id at 1561.
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concludes by summarizing the factual background, the relevant
arguments, and the proposed solution to the issue discussed
herein.
I. THE CFAA AND ITS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
At the start of the 1980's, the American public began to
perceive a new type of criminal threat: the computer hacker. 20
Due, in part, to the growing availability of "inexpensive personal
computers[,] ...

the dramatic growth of computer literacy, . . .

and [ ] the introduction of the computer network," hacking
became both more accessible and more feared, and, as a result,
hackers gained prominence and infamy. 21 Popular media also
helped bring the issue of computer hacking to the public's
consciousness with the 1983 film, War Games, which "provid[ed]
a point of cultural reference regarding the dangers of computers
and their users."22 Against this backdrop, legislators felt
compelled to act.23
As an initial response to concerns about computer hacking,
Congress enacted the Counterfeit Access Device and Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984.24 At that time, § 1030 of that act
criminalized certain actions committed by a person who
"knowingly accesse[d] a computer without authorization, or
having accessed a computer with authorization, use[d] the
opportunity such access provide[d] for purposes to which such
authorization d[id] not extend."25 Under that 1984 version of
§ 1030, a person meeting one of the scienter-based access
requirements was subject to criminal liability in three scenarios.
Specifically, the 1984 version of § 1030(a) read as follows:

20 See generally Deirdre Black, The Computer Hacker Electronic Vandal or Scout
of the Networks?, 4 J L & Information Science 65 (1993).
21 Id at 66.
22 Joseph M. Olivenbaum, <Ctrl> <Alt> <Delete>: Rethinking
the Federal Computer
Crime Legislation, 27 Seton Hall L Rev 574, 582 (1997).
23 HR Rep No 98-894, 98th Cong, 2d Sess 1984 (1984), reprinted in
1984 USCCAN
3689 (citing the War Games depiction of computer hacking as a reference point for the
dangers to which Congress had to respond in its proposal to criminalize computerrelated crimes).
24 Counterfeit Access Act of 1984, 98 Stat 2190. See also HR Rep No 98-894, 98th
Cong, 2d Sess 1984 (1984), reprinted in 1984 USCCAN 3689 (noting the lack of federal
legislation dealing with computer crimes and the need for such legislation in light of the
emergence of hackers taking advantage of increased "computer networking").
25 Counterfeit Access Act of 1984, 98
Stat at 2190-92.
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(a) Whoeverwithout
a
computer
accesses
knowingly
(1)
authorization, or having accessed a computer with
authorization, uses the opportunity such access
provides for purposes to which such authorization does
not extend, and by means of such conduct obtains
information that has been determined by the United
States Government . . . to require protection against

unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national defense
or foreign relations . . . with the intent or reason to

believe that such information so obtained is to be used
to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage
of any foreign nation;
(2)
knowingly
accesses
a computer
without
authorization, or having accessed a computer with
authorization, uses the opportunity such access
provides for purposes to which such authorization does
not extend, and thereby obtains information contained
in a financial record of a financial institution, . . . or
contained in a file of a consumer reporting agency on a
consumer . ; or
(3)
knowingly
accesses
a
computer
without
authorization, or having accessed a computer with
authorization, uses the opportunity such access
provides for purposes to which such authorization does
not extend, and by means of such conduct knowingly
uses, modifies, destroys, or discloses information in, or
prevents authorized use of, such computer, if such
computer is operated for or on behalf of the
Government of the United States and such conduct
affects such operation;
shall be punished[.] 26
Succinctly summarized, the three scenarios in which the
1984 CFAA criminalized computer access without or beyond
authorization were "misuse to obtain national security

26

18 USC

§ 1030(a) (Supp II

1985).
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secrets,... [misuse] to obtain personal financial records, and
hacking into U.S. government computers." 27
Two years later, Congress expanded the list of federal
computer crimes enumerated in the CFAA by enacting the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986.28 Specifically, Congress
added three new scenarios under which persons could face
CFAA liability.2 9 These new scenarios were codified at
§ 1030(a)(4)-(6), which read in 1986 as follows:
(a) Whoever-

(4) knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a
Federal interest computer without authorization, or
exceeds authorized access, and by means of such
conduct furthers the intended fraud and obtains
anything of value .. .;
(5) intentionally accesses a Federal interest computer
without authorization, and by means of one or more
instances of such conduct, alters, damages, or destroys
information in any such Federal interest computer, or
prevents authorized use of any such computer or
information and thereby(A) causes loss to one or more others of a value
aggregating $1,000 or more during any one year
period; or
(B) modifies or impairs . . . the medical care of one or

more individuals; or
(6) knowingly and with intent to defraud traffics . . . in
any password. .. through which a computer may be
accessed without authorization, if(A) such trafficking affects interstate
commerce; or

or foreign

Kerr, 94 Minn L Rev at 1564 (cited in note 12).
Pub L No 99-474, 100 Stat 1213, amending 18 USC § 1030 ("Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act").
29
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act § 2(d), 100 Stat at 1213-14.
27
28
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(B) such computer is used by or for the Government
of the United States;
shall be punished[.]3 0
Most importantly for the purpose of this Comment,
Congress replaced the "or having accessed a computer with
authorization, uses the opportunity such access provides for
purposes to which such authorization does not extend" language
in the 1984 version of § 1030(a)(1), (2), and (3) with the words
"or exceeds authorized access."3 1 The new "exceeds authorized
access" language, which phrase was defined to mean "to access a
computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or
alter information in the computer that the accesser is not
entitled to obtain or alter," 32 was also incorporated into the new
§ 1030(a)(4) offense. 33 To this day, the "exceeds authorized
access" language remains unchanged in those sections of the
CFAA. 34 The Senate Report from the time of this amendment
indicates that the Committee on the Judiciary intended this
change to clarify "one of the murkier grounds of liability, under
which a [person's] access to computerized data might be
legitimate in some circumstances, but criminal in other (not
clearly distinguishable) circumstances that might be held to
exceed his authorization."3 5
In 1994, Congress further expanded the reach of the CFAA
by establishing a private right of action for individuals harmed
by certain violations of the CFAA.36 That private right of action

3
18 USC § 1030(a)(4)-(6) (1982 and Supp IV 1987). The 1986 enactment limited
several of the new § 1030(a) violations to "Federal interest computer[s]," defined as
computers used by the United States Government or by a financial institution or as two
or more computers involved in an "interstate offense over an interstate network."
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act § 2(d), (g), 100 Stat at 1213-15, codified at 18 USC
§ 1030(a)(4)-(5), (e)(2) (1982 and Supp IV 1987).
31 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act § 2(b), (c), (d), 100 Stat at 1213-14. See also
Senate Judiciary Committee Report on the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, S Rep
No 99-432, 99th Cong, 2d Sess 9 (1986), reprinted in 1986 USCCAN 2479.
32 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act § 2(g), 100 Stat at 1215, codified at 18 USC
§ 1030(e)(6) (1982 and Supp IV 1987).
3
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act § 2(d), 100 Stat at 1213.
See 18 USC § 1030.
3
3
S Rep No 99-432 at 21 (cited in note 31).
3
Computer Abuse Amendments Act of 1994, Pub L No 103-322, 108 Stat 2097,
2098 (1994).
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exists in its current form at § 1030(g). 37 Through the use of the
CFAA's civil provision, persons responsible for authorizing
computer use are able to police authorized users and bring suits
for damages arising from violations of authorized use, both
through access without authorization and access exceeding
authorization. 38 Many of the cases contributing to the CFAA
jurisprudence were brought under the § 1030(g) private right of
action, usually in the employment context. 39 Indeed,
employment-related computer use is a clear example of when an
employer-authorizer can impose strict limits on an employeeuser's access.
Additional amendments throughout the 1990s and 2000s
expanded the scope of the CFAA by extending the applicability
of certain CFAA violations to the ever-expanding category of
"protected computers." 40 The CFAA's current definition of
"protected computers" covers both computers used by the United
States Government or financial institutions, as originally
intended by the drafters of § 1030,41 and computers "used in or
affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication." 42
The remaining CFAA violations apply to all "computers," 43
which, as defined means "any high speed data processing
device ...
and includes any data storage facility or
communications facility directly related to or operating in
conjunction

with such device, but . ..

does not include

an

automated typewriter or typesetter, a portable hand held
calculator, or other similar device." 44 Thus, the CFAA
37 See 18 USC § 1030(g) ("Any person who suffers damage or loss by reason of a
violation of this section may maintain a civil action against the violator to obtain
compensatory damages and injunctive relief or other equitable relief.').
3 18 USC § 1030(g). See also Andrew T. Hernacki, Comment, A Vague Law in a
Smartphone World: Limiting the Scope of Unauthorized Access under the Computer
Fraudand Abuse Act, 61 Am U L Rev 1543, 1551-52 (2012).
3 See, for example, United States v Nosal, 676 F3d 854, 860 n 6 (9th Cir 2012)
(noting employers' use of the "CFAA against employees in civil cases").
40
18 USC § 1030(e)(2)(B) (Supp II 1995) (introducing the "protected computers"
language); 18 USC § 1030(e)(2)(B) (Supp II 2004) (enlarging the definition of "protected
computers" to reach computers outside of the United States); 18 USC § 1030(e)(2)(B)
(Supp II 2009) (modifying the definition of "protected computers" to encompass not just
computers used in intrastate and foreign commerce but also computers "affecting"
interstate and foreign commerce).
41 See 18 USC § 1030 (Supp II 1985).
42
18 USC § 1030(e)(2).
43 18 USC § 1030(e)(1).
4 18 USC § 1030(e)(1) (defining "computer").
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applicability extends beyond commonly considered devices like
personal computers, desktops, and laptops. By incrementally
expanding both the scope of devices and the uses of such devices
governed by the CFAA, Congress effectively ensured that any
device with access to the Internet, regardless of whether it is
actually used in interstate commerce, is governed by the
CFAA. 45
Today, the expanded language of the CFAA imposes liability
in the following circumstances:
(a) Whoever(1) having knowingly accessed a computer without
authorization or exceeding authorized access, and by
means of such conduct having obtained information
that has been determined. . . to require protection
willfully
disclosure . ..
unauthorized
against

communicates, delivers, transmits,... the same to any
person not entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the
same and fails to deliver it to the officer or employee of
the United States entitled to receive it;
without
computer
a
accesses
(2) intentionally
authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby
obtains(A) information contained in a financial record of a
financial institution,

..

. or contained in a file of a

consumer reporting agency on a consumer,...

;

(B) information from any department or agency of the
United States; or
(C) information from any protected computer;

(4) knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a
protected computer without authorization, or exceeds
authorized access, and by means of such conduct
Kerr, 94 Minn L Rev at 1570-71 (cited in note 12) ("[The new definition of
4
'protected computers'] does not merely cover computers connected to the Internet that
are actually 'used' in interstate commerce. Instead, it applies to all computers, period, so
[far as the Commerce Clause will allow].") (citations omitted).
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furthers the intended fraud and obtains anything of
value ... ;
... shall be punished[.] 46
As evident from the language above, the two types of
liability under § 1030(a)(1), (2), and (4) are when a user gains
access without authorization and when an authorized user
exceeds authorized access. 47 Although the term "exceeds
authorized access" is defined in the statute, 48 the difference
between those two types of violations is not obvious. Indeed,
several courts have struggled to pair putatively illegal activities
with the appropriate type of CFAA liability. 49 However, one
portion of the legislative history of the CFAA begins to
illuminate the difference between the types of activities
prohibited by the CFAA's "exceeds authorized access" provision
and the types of activities prohibited by the "without
authorization" provision. The Senate's Judiciary Committee
post-enactment report on the 1994 amendments to the CFAA
indicates that the distinction between the two provisions was
understood by the Committee to rest on the user's affiliation
with the computer in question.5 0 Under this interpretation, an
outside user who gains access to a computer through clandestine
means, such as "deliberately break[ing] into a computer," would
be liable for accessing a computer "without authorization"; while
an inside user who has authorization to access a computer but
surpasses the confines of that authorization by "obtain[ing] or
alter[ing] information in the computer that [he] is not entitled so
to obtain or alter" would be liable for "exceeding authorized
access" to the computer.51

46

18 USC § 1030(a)(1), (2), (4).

4

18 USC § 1030(a)(1), (2), (4).

See 18 USC § 1030(e)(6) ("[T]he term 'exceeds authorized access' means to access
a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in
the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter.").
49
See notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
5
Senate Judiciary Committee Report on The National Information Infrastructure
ProtectionAct of 1995, S Rep No 104-357, 104th Cong, 2nd Sess 10 (1996).
51 S Rep No 104-357 at 6, 21 (cited
in note 50).
4
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II. CFAA CASE LAW
The legal consequences for violating the CFAA are not
trivial: individuals convicted of a CFAA violation face penalties
of between one and ten years in prison. 52 But the law is far from
settled, and this confusion breeds uncertainty for consumers
who may use Internet social networking services and other
Internet services in violation of the Terms of Service. The
importance of correctly defining "without authorization" and
"exceeds authorized access" is twofold. First, determining the
respective definitions of the two phrases will help identify
within which category an indictable activity should be analyzed.
And second, defining the two forms of liability more precisely
will help highlight which activities the CFAA may reach at all.
Accordingly, understanding what activities trigger what types of
liability under the CFAA, as well as whether certain activities
can even be reached by the CFAA, will clarify the law to protect
legitimate computer use while guarding against the kind of
abuses that the CFAA was intended to address.
A.

Distinguishing "Without Authorization" From "Exceeding
Authorized Access"

Determining that a user acted "without authorization" is
fairly simple where that user hacked into or otherwise accessed
a computer that he had no permission or right to access. In
United States v Ivanov, 53 for example, the court easily found that
a foreign hacker who accessed a company's computers and took
possession of its data acted "without authorization" under the
CFAA.54 Because the perpetrator of the unauthorized access, a
Russian hacker, was
completely unaffiliated with the
Connecticut online financial clearinghouse whose computers he
accessed, "[took] complete control over [their] data, and
consequently, had possession of it," the court almost
automatically determined that he violated the CFAA's "without
authorization" provision.5 5

52 See Scott Eltringham, ed, Prosecuting Computer Crimes Manual *47, online at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/docs/ccmanual.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013).
53 175 F Supp 2d 367 (D Conn 2001).
' Id at 371-72.
55

Id.
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However, courts have historically had trouble determining
whether an individual "exceed[ed] authorized access" or acted
"without authorization" when the individual had limited
authorization to access a computer and its data but exceeded
that authorization in some way. For instance, in International
Airport Centers, LLC v Citrin,5 6 the Seventh Circuit held that an
employee who had been authorized to access his employer's
computers nonetheless accessed those computers "without
authorization" after the employee lost his authorization.5 7
Consequently, the court determined that the employee breached
his duty of loyalty to his employer when he violated his
employment contract by starting a competing business and
permanently deleting files on the employer's computers, against
the employer's interests.5 8 Because the agency relationship
between the employer-principal and the employee-agent was
terminated by the employee's breach, the Seventh Circuit
reasoned that the employee lost his authorization to access the
employer's computers and concluded that he, most likely, acted
"without authorization." 59
Interestingly, the Seventh Circuit in Citrin only fleetingly
considered the distinction between "exceeds authorized access"
and "without authorization." While the court briefly struggled to
distinguish the two phrases, it ultimately determined the
distinction to be "paper thin"6 0 and, as explained above, relied
instead on the duty of loyalty inherent in an agency relationship
to determine the limits of the employer's access.
Other courts have been reluctant to apply the Seventh
Circuit's holding in Citrin to similar employment contexts. 6 1 For
example, the Ninth Circuit in LVRC Holdings, LLC v Brekka 62
explained that authorization within the meaning of the CFAA
depends not on the user's actions with respect to the computer

5
5
58

440 F3d 418 (7th Cir 2006).
Id at 420-21.
Id at 419.

5
440 F3d at 421. The Seventh Circuit considered this case on appeal after the
plaintiff's suit was dismissed by the trial court. As such, the court did not reach any
definitive conclusions on the questions of fact, but rather reversed the dismissal,
reinstated the suit, and remanded it to the trial court.
' Id at 420.
61 LVRC Holdings, LLC v Brekka, 581 F3d 1127 (9th Cir 2009). See also WEC
CarolinaEnergy Solutions LLV v Miller, 687 F3d 199 (4th Cir 2012).
62 581 F3d 1127 (9th
Cir 2009).
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and data he is authorized to access but rather on the authorizing
party's actions.6 3 In Brekka, the court held that an employee of
an operator of residential treatment centers did not violate the
CFAA when he emailed company documents to his private
computer and continued to access the company's web-marketing
statistics even after terminating his employment. 64 Notably, the
employee "did not have a written employment agreement, nor
did [the employer] promulgate employee guidelines that would
prohibit employees from emailing [company] documents to
personal computers."6 5 The court reasoned that a user cannot be
liable under the CFAA's "without authorization" provision
unless the authorizing party-usually the user's employer-has
expressly withdrawn the user's authorization to access the
computers and data before the user undertakes the contested
actions. 66 Because the employee in that case was authorized to
access the information at issue since he had been given
permission to use the company's computers, he could not have
acted "without authorization." 6 7 Thus, according to the Brekka
court, if the authorizing party cannot show that it explicitly
withdrew a user's authorization, the case against the user who
is authorized access "for certain purposes but goes beyond those
limitations" must be pursued under the "exceeds authorized
access" provision of the CFAA. 68
The Ninth Circuit also rejected the application of duty of
loyalty and agency principles to determine authorization and
criticized the Seventh Circuit for taking such an expansive view
and novel interpretation of a criminal statute. 69 According to the
Brekka court, the approach in Citrin neither "comported with
the plain language of the CFAA, . . . [nor provided] defendant
[with sufficient] notice as to which acts" could be punishable
under the statute. 70
The Brekka approach is different from the Seventh Circuit's
approach because it vehemently rejects the notion, embraced by

*Id at 1133-34.
6

Id at 1130, 1136.

*

Id at 1129.
Brekka, 581 F3d at 1133.
Id.

6
67

6s
69
70

Id.
Id at 1135.
Brekka, 581 F3d at 1135.
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the Citrin court, that a user's actions alone can bring him within
the scope of the CFAA's "exceeds authorized access" provision.
Indeed, under the Brekka approach, a user cannot be liable for
access without authorization until the authorizing party clearly
"rescind[s] the [user's] right to use the computer."7 1 Thus, the
Brekka approach tends to push more cases into the "exceeds
authorized access" version of CFAA liability. Proceeding under
the "exceeds authorized access" provisions of the CFAA,
however, comes with its own set of problems, which are
exemplified by a recently developed circuit split.
B.

The "Exceeds Authorized Access" Circuit Split
1.

Intended use analysis.

The Fifth Circuit addressed the meaning of the phrase

"exceeds authorized access" in United States v John72 and
focused on the use for which the authorized user's access was
intended.7 3 In John, the government prosecuted a former
employee of a financial institution for "exceeding authorized
access to a protected computer" to obtain financial information
in violation of § 1030(a)(2). 74 The employee had used her access
to the institution's internal computer system to provide a third
party with customer account information that was subsequently
used to incur fraudulent charges.7 5 After being convicted at the
trial court level, the employee argued on appeal that she was in
fact authorized to access the customer account information and
therefore could not have exceeded her authorized access level.76
The Fifth Circuit rejected the employee's contention, holding
that an employee who uses information beyond its intended use
exceeds authorized access.7 7 Generally, the court noted, "the
scope of a user's authorization to access a protected computer [is
determined] on the basis of the expected norms of intended use
or the nature of the relationship established between the

71

Id.

72 597 F3d 263 (5th Cir 2010).
71

14

Id at 271.
Id at 270.

Id.
John, 597 F3d at 271.
n Id at 272.
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computer owner and the user."78 Here, the employer-employee
relationship, along with the employer's official policy,
"prohibit[ing] misuse of the company's internal computer
systems and confidential customer information," defined the
scope of the employee's authorization. 7 Thus, while the
employee was authorized to access the customer account
information for legitimate employment-related purposes, she
was not authorized to access it "for any and all purposes."80
Because the employee had "reason to know that ... she [was]

not authorized to access data or information in furtherance of a
criminally fraudulent scheme," the court found that she had
exceeded authorized access in violation of the CFAA. 81
In United States v Rodriguez,82 the Eleventh Circuit also
considered the meaning of "exceeds authorized access." 83
Seemingly agreeing with the Fifth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit
applied its own variation of the intended use analysis. 84 In
Rodriguez, a former employee of the Social Security
Administration used his access to the Administration's database
to access the personal information of over a dozen individuals for
reasons unrelated to his job. 5 Like the employee in John, the
employee argued on appeal that his access was authorized
because he had access to the information in the ordinary course
of his job. 8 6 Taking the same approach as the Fifth Circuit, the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that because the employee had been
told that "he was not authorized to obtain information for
nonbusiness reasons," he exceeded his authorized access when
he accessed the information in violation of that policy. 8 7 Going
further, the Rodriguez court distinguished between situations in
which an employee violates a clear policy delineating the proper
use of accessed information-which, as was the case in
Rodriguez, result in "exceeds authorized access" liability-and

7

Id at 271, citing United States v Philips, 477 F3d 215, 219 (4th Cir 2007).
John, 597 F3d at 271-272.

8

Id 272.

78

"' Id at 273.
82

628 F3d 1258 (11th Cir 2010).

8

Id at 1263.
Id.
Id at 1260.
Rodriguez, 628 F3d at 1263.
Id.

'
3
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situations in which no such policy exists. In the second class of
scenarios-where no clear policy on use of electronically
accessed information exists-the Fifth Circuit implied that the
Ninth Circuit's approach in Brekka was correct in finding that
the employee there did not violate the CFAA.88
In summary, both the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits focus on
the nature of the relationship between the authorizing party (in
the cases, an employer) and the authorized party (an employee),
with regard to workplace norms and the resulting policies, in
order to determine the scope of the authorization. Because
employment establishes a relationship between the employer
and employee, policies can easily embody the expected norms of
acceptable and permissible employee behavior. The employee in
John exceeded the scope of her authorization because she used
her authorized access in a way that was beyond the expected
norms of the employer-employee relationship upon which the
employer's policy was based; the employee in Rodriguez
exceeded the scope of his authorization because he used his
authorized access for a purpose other than conducting his duties
as an employee, a norm embodied in his employer's policy. This
approach, which interprets the phrase "exceeds authorized
access" in reference to the reason for the authorization, can be
characterized as intended use analysis.
2.

The narrower approach.

Other courts, however, have rejected the intended use
89 a
approach. In EF Cultural Travel BV v Zefer Corporation,

corporation sued its competitor for using a "scraper tool"-"a
computer program that accesses information contained in a
succession of webpages stored on the accessed computer"-to
collect pricing information from the corporation's publicly
accessible website.9 0 On appeal, the First Circuit refused to
analyze the expected norms between the two unaffiliated parties
in order to determine the scope of the competitor's authorization
to access the public website. 91 Instead, the court held that
because the corporation could easily use explicit terms to define

as Id. See also text accompanying notes 62-71.
89 318 F3d 58 (1st Cir 2003).
g1 Id at 60-61.
9'

Id at 63.
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the scope of authorized access to its website and notify users of
those terms, the court would not infer implicit limits to the
public website's use. 9 2 "[P]ublic website provider[s] can easily
spell out explicitly what is forbidden," so there is no need for a
court to put public "users at the mercy of a highly imprecise,
litigation-spawning standard like 'reasonable expectations"' on
the limits of authorization. 9 3
Even within the employment context, some courts have
moved away from the intended use analysis. For example,
although the Ninth Circuit in Brekka court determined that the
defendant employee did not act "without authorization" when he
emailed company documents to himself and continued to access
the company's online information even after terminating his
employment, 94 the court also considered the employer's implicit
argument that the defendant employee "exceeded authorized
access" in violation of Section 1030(a)(2), (4).95 The court
criticized the broad interpretation of "exceeds authorized
access." 96 Specifically, the court refused to read an intended use
requirement into the CFAA's "exceeds authorized access"
provision because it found no support for such a requirement in
the definition of "exceeds authorized access" or in the language
of the CFAA as a whole. 9 7 The court reasoned that, even in the
civil context, the CFAA should be construed narrowly so as to
ensure that it does not "impose unexpected burdens on
defendants."98 The court concluded that the only sensible
approach to "exceeds authorized access" was as a reference to
someone who "has permission to access the computer but
accesses information on the computer that [he] is not entitled to
access," rather than as a reference to the reason for the
authorization.9 9 Thus, because the defendant employee was
authorized, as part of his employment, to access both the

2

Id at

62.

* EF CulturalTravel, 318 F3d at 63.
* See notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
s Brekka, 581 F3d at 1135 & n 7. The employer's charge that the employee
"exceeded authorization" was considered an implicit argument because on appeal to the
Ninth Circuit the employer only argued that the employee acted "without authorization."
Id at 1135 n 7.
96 See id at 1133-35.
*Id at 1133-34.

9

Id at 1134-35.
Brekka, 581 F3d at 1133.
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computer and the information, he was not liable for an "exceeds
authorized access" violation.1 00
The Ninth Circuit affirmed its denunciation of the
expansive intended use approach to "exceeds authorized access"
cases in its en banc rehearing of United States v Nosal.10 1 In
Nosal, the government prosecuted employees of an executive
search firm for violating § 1030(a)(4) of the CFAA after they
downloaded information from a confidential database and
transferred that information to a former employee who was in
the process of starting a competing business. 102 Although the
employees were authorized to access the database, their access
was limited exclusively for the firm's business. 103 Initially, the
district court rejected the defendant employees' motion to
dismiss the CFAA charges based on a narrow construction of
§ 1030.104 However, the defendant employees tried again shortly
after, filing both a motion to dismiss and a motion for
reconsideration, on the basis of the Ninth Circuit decision in
Brekka.105 This time, the district court agreed with the
defendant employees and dismissed the CFAA charges,10 6 but
the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded once the government
appealed.107 Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit granted a
rehearing en banc. 108
At the en banc rehearing, the Ninth Circuit was faced with
the government's argument that the scope of "exceeds
authorized access" should be determined by reference to the
permissible use of authorization; nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit
held that "exceeds authorized access . .. does not extend to
violations of use restrictions" and dismissed the CFAA charges
against the employees. 109 In arriving at that decision, the Ninth
Circuit chose between two competing approaches to the meaning
of "exceeds authorized access": (1) "someone who is authorized to

"o Id at 1135, 1129.
'0' 676 F3d 854 (9th Cir 2012).
102
Id at 856 & n 1.
103
Id.
104

United States v Nosal, 2009 WL 981336, *7 (ND Cal).

105 Nosal, 676 F3d at 856.
106
107

United States v Nosal, 2010 WL 934257, *9 (ND Cal).
United States v Nasal, 642 F3d 781, 791 (9th Cir 2011).

'0

Nosal, 676 F3d at 856.

10

Id at 863-64.
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access only certain data or files but accesses unauthorized data
or files"; or (2) "someone who has unrestricted access to a
computer, but is limited in the use to which he can put the
information."o10 The court rejected the second definition, and
therefore the intended use approach, because it improperly
"transform[ed] the CFAA from an anti-hacking statute into an
expansive misappropriation statute," an expansion the court
found improper without clear congressional intent."' The court
was also satisfied that the first approach-that "someone who
[was] authorized to access only certain data or files but
accesse[d] unauthorized data or files" has "exceeded authorized
access"-maintained
the
distinction
between
"exceeds
authorized access" and "without authorization" by focusing on
the extent of the access rather than its use. Moreover, the court
found that approach to be consistent with the congressional
understanding, evidenced in the legislative history, of the
distinction as one between insider users and outsider users.112
Noting the expansive definition of "protected computers"
under the CFAA, the Nosal court also expressed concerns about
the scope and breadth of the CFAA outside of the employment
context by observing that "the [broad] interpretation of 'exceeds
authorized access' makes every violation of a private computer
use policy a federal crime."11 3 The court then described a
plethora of innocuous activities that might become federal
crimes if the broad, intended use approach to "exceeds
authorized access" was universally adopted, including lying on
an online dating profile and posting "inappropriate materials"
for sale on eBay-a practice prohibited by the eBay User
Agreement but lacking an explanation of what is and is not
appropriate.1 1 4 Thus, while the court conceded that minor
violations would likely not be prosecuted under the CFAA, it
refused to interpret "exceeds authorized access" in a way that
would require the public "to live at the mercy of [the] local
prosecutor." 1 5
110 Id
n1

at 857.

Id.

..
2 Nosal, 676 F3d at 858, citing Senate Judiciary Committee Report on the Computer
Fraudand Abuse Act of 1986, S Rep No 99-432, 99th Cong, 2d Sess 9 (1986), reprinted in
1986 USCCAN 2479. See also notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
113 Nosal, 676 F3d at
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114
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Further demonstrating the controversy involved in the
phrase "exceeds authorized access," two judges dissented from
the en banc decision in Nosal. Disagreeing with the narrow
definition adopted by the majority, the dissent argued that the
intended use analysis employed by the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits should be adopted.1 16 In the dissent's view, the intended
use analysis was supported and contemplated by the plain
language of the CFAA and its definition of "exceeds authorized
access." 117 The dissenters were also critical of the "parade of
horribles" presented by the majority as support for a narrow
reading of "exceeds authorized access.""1 "
III. RECENT CFAA DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INTERNET SERVICE
CONTEXT

United States v Drew

A.

In 2006, Lori Drew created a fake MySpace profile,
pretending to be an attractive teenage boy, and used it to
contact Megan Meier, a former friend of Drew's teenage
daughter.1 1 9 Over the course of two months, Drew continued the
ruse, while Meier and the fictional boy developed a deep
relationship. 120 Then, after the fictional boy suddenly rejected
Meier, telling her in a message that that "the world would be a
better place without [her]," Meier hanged herself and died.121
The government prosecuted Drew under § 1030(a)(2)(C) and
§ 1030(c)(2)(B)(ii) 122 of the CFAA for creating a MySpace profile
in violation of the MySpace Terms of Service.123 Because the
MySpace Terms of Service prohibited creating a fake profile, the
government contended that Drew "intentionally accessed
MySpace's computer/servers without authorization and/or in

116

Nosal, 676 F3d at 865 (Silverman and Tallman dissenting).
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Id.
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Id at 866.

Indictment, United States v Drew, CR08-00582, *6-8 (CD Cal filed May 15, 2008)
(available on Westlaw at 2008 WL 2078622) ("Drew Indictment"). See also United States
v Drew, 259 FRD 448 (CD Cal 2009).
119
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Section 1030(c)(2)(B)(ii) of the CFAA imposes a fine and a maximum prison term
of five years for offenses under § 1030(a)(2).
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Drew Indictment at *9-10.
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excess of authorization" in violation of the CFAA.124 When a jury
convicted Drew, she moved for a judgment of acquittal.125 The
trial court conceded that the owner of a website is permitted to
dictate the "limitations[,] restrictions[, and ] conditions" placed
on users of the website, but ultimately concluded that the
MySpace Terms of Service were an inadequate basis for criminal
liability.126 Accordingly, the court granted Drew's motion for
acquittal.127
Initially, the court concluded that an intentional breach of
the Terms of Service could "potentially constitute accessing the
MySpace computer/server without authorization and/or in
excess of authorization under the [CFAA]" because the owner of
a website may properly define the conditions and limitations on
access to his website.12 8 Nevertheless, the court refused to
extend criminal liability under the Terms of Service because
doing so would render the CFAA void under the constitutional
vagueness doctrine.129 The void for vagueness doctrine requires
that statutes be sufficiently specific so that the public has notice
of what activity the law criminalizes and law enforcement has
clear guidelines to determine the application of the law.1 30
The court first addressed the notice requirement and found
that the CFAA did not explicitly, or implicitly, criminalize
breaches of contract, and even if it did, basing CFAA violations
on a Terms of Service agreement would be "unacceptably
vague."131 The court anticipated further vagueness issues arising
from allowing website owners to define criminal conduct through
the Terms of Services; this was especially troubling to the court
since Terms of Service tend to be vague and website owners
often retain the right to unilaterally alter them.132 Additionally,

124
125
126
127
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Drew, 259 FRD at 461.
Id at 451.
Id at 462.
Id at 468.
Drew, 259 FRD at 461-62.

Id at 467.
Id at 463. The void for vagueness doctrine encompasses a due process limitation
on criminal statutes by requiring that a statute "define the criminal offense [1] with
sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited
and [2] in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement."
Skilling v US, 130 S Ct 2896, 2927-28 (2010) (alterations in original).
13'
Drew, 259 FRD at 464.
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the court predicted that complications would arise from applying
"contractual requirements within the applicable [T]erm of
[S]ervice to [ ] criminal prosecution[s]."133 The court then
confronted the guidelines for law enforcement requirement and
held that even if "[a] conscious breach of a website's [T]erms of
[S]ervice is held to be sufficient by itself to constitute
intentionally accessing a computer without authorization or in
excess of authorization, the result will be that [the
CFAA] becomes a law 'that affords too much discretion to the
police."'13 4 Ultimately, the court held that because the CFAA
does not adequately describe the type of activity it criminalizes
such that "individuals of 'common intelligence' are on notice that
a breach" of such terms is a crime, applying the CFAA in the
Terms of Service context would not be sufficiently clear for
criminal liability to attach. 135
Notably, the court in Drew was unclear about whether
enforcement of the CFAA based on Terms of Service violations
would always, under any circumstances, cause adequate notice
and guidelines for law enforcement issues under the void for
vagueness doctrine. The court did not clarify whether the CFAA
is vague as applied to the limited facts it was considering, or
whether it is always vague when applied to Terms of Service
even if the troubling characteristics the court flagged in
MySpace's Terms of Service were eliminated.
B.

Aaron Swartz

The 2013 suicide of Internet activist Aaron Swartz brought
the CFAA back into the media spotlight.136 In 2009, Swartz, a
computer programmer and open-government activist, used a
free trial of the government-run Public Access to Court
Electronic Records (PACER) system to download almost 20
percent of the documents in the database, which he

134

Id.
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subsequently openly posted online. 137 The Federal Bureau of
Investigations was unable to find any illegality in Swartz's
actions and closed its investigation in April 2009.138
Less than two years later, Swartz again caught the
attention of law enforcement. This time, the government
managed to indict Swartz for alleged misuse of the online
database JSTOR, which "provides an online system for archiving
and providing access to academic journals and journal
articles."13 9 Swartz had valid access to JSTOR because he was a
fellow at Harvard University. 140 Although Swartz was not
affiliated with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT),
he used guest access to MIT's computer network to download 4.8
million documents from JSTOR over a period of almost five
months. 141 During the five-month period, Swartz repeatedly
thwarted attempts by both MIT and JSTOR to restrict his
ability to download documents from the JSTOR database; for
example, by using multiple computers, establishing new IP
addresses, and changing MAC addresses. 142
Swartz was charged with various computer-related crimes,
including "[u]nlawfully
[o]btaining [i]nformation from a
[p]rotected [c]omputer" under § 1030(a)(3), one of the CFAA's
"unauthorized access" provisions. 14 3 The charges against Swartz
exposed him to potential sanctions of up to thirty-five years in
prison and millions of dollars in fines. 144 Swartz committed
suicide in January 2013, which some commentators have

1'
John Schwartz, An Effort to Upgrade a Court Archive System to Free and Easy,
NY Times A16 (Feb 13, 2009).
138 See Ryan Singel, FBI Investigated Coder for Liberating
Paywalled Court Records

(Wired Oct 5, 2009), online at http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/10/swartz-fbil
(visited Sept 15, 2013).
139 Superseding Indictment, United States v Swartz, 11-CR-10260,
*1 (D Mass filed
Sept 12, 2012) (available on Westlaw at 2012 WL 4341933) ("Swartz Indictment").
140 Id at *3.
14
Id at *2-3. See also Caroline Bankoff, Reddit Co-Founder and JSTOR Hacker
Aaron Swartz Commits Suicide (New York Magazine Jan 12, 2013), online at
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2013/01/jstor-hacker-aaron-swartz-commitssuicide.html (visited Sept 15, 2013).
142 Swartz Indictment at *4-9. A MAC address is a unique identifying number on a
wireless device. Mackenzie Williams, Letter to the Editor: Wireless Security, Wyo Law 8
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attributed to pressures caused by prosecutorial overreaching.1 4 5
In any event, legal experts, and politicians have started to take
a closer look at the CFAA and its implications for the everyday
use of online services. 146
As the Lori Drew and Aaron Swartz cases demonstrate, the
CFAA is extremely broad and can possibly be interpreted in a
way that potentially criminalizes the behavior of any individual
who uses a computer device with the capability to connect to the
Internet in a way that is contrary to what a website's owner
deems permissible. Certainly, Lori Drew's actions and their
consequences are morally deplorable, however, until we can
distinguish and narrow CFAA liability to only reach the type of
behavior she engaged in, and avoid potentially criminalizing
even the most innocuous violations of a website's Terms of
Service, we should be wary of the application of the CFAA
outside of the employment context. Therefore, the proper
definition of any of the terms integral to determining liability
under the CFAA-including "without authorization" and
"exceeds authorized access"-is critical to understanding the
application of the CFAA in the Internet service context.
IV. THE APPLICABILITY OF EXISTING CFAA JURISPRUDENCE TO
THE INTERNET SERVICE CONTEXT

In light of the legal regime discussed above-including the
latent circuit split over the meaning of the phrase "exceeds
authorized access" and the government's increasingly aggressive
use of the CFAA-can the CFAA be applied outside the
employment context without extending liability to harmless
behavior? In answering that question, this Comment provides a
fuller understanding of the ways in which the CFAA can be held
applicable to Internet services that require a user to register
and acquiesce to certain terms prior to using the service. This
analysis is important for two reasons. First, social networking
sites are increasingly popular and it is important that users
understand the legal ramifications of joining such sites. Second,
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violations of the CFAA are punishable by a range of means from
monetary fines or damages to imprisonment. Together, these
two realities make for a volatile environment in which a vast
number of Internet services users are unaware and uncertain of
what may constitute culpable behavior or what the consequence
of that behavior could be. This Comment tries to bring some
clarity and predictability to this environment by suggesting
guidelines for the application of the CFAA in the Internet
services context.
A.

Meaning of "Exceeds Authorized Access" vs "Without
Authorization"

In the Internet services context, as in the employment
context, the first order question is whether a user's access
exceeded authorization or was without authorization. Thus, the
first step in understanding the applicability of the CFAA in the
non-employment context is to properly distinguish between
consumer situations in which access is undertaken "without
authorization" and those in which use "exceeds authorized
access." The distinction between the two scienter-based access
requirements must be maintained in order to remain true to the
legislative intent that animated the inclusion of both phrases in
the language of the CFAA.
1.

Rejecting the Seventh Circuit.

The interpretation employed by the Seventh Circuit in
Citrin-thata user who previously received authorization to use
a computer can be liable for a "without authorization" violation
if such authorization is inpliedly rescinded following a breach of
a duty owed to the authorizing party1 4 -should not be extended
to the consumer context. That approach is inconsistent with the
plain language of the CFAA because it completely eradicates
any distinction between the two scienter-based access
requirements and renders the inclusion of "exceeds authorized
access" redundant. If any user who acts outside of his authorized
access is treated as acting "without authorization," there is no
scenario under which he would be liable for exceeding authorized

147
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access rather than accessing a computer system without
authorization.
The Seventh Circuit's approach to "without authorization"
is also problematic in the Internet services context because it
introduces common law elements into the CFAA that are
inapplicable outside of the employment context. Specifically, this
approach is based on the duty inherent in the relationship of
agency between the employer-authorizer and the employee-user.
Since the law has not recognized a similar agency relationship
between an Internet service provider and an Internet service
user, the rationale is inoperative in the consumer context.
Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit's approach to "without
authorization" and "exceeds authorized access" cannot be used
in the Internet service context because it neither provides a
basis for defining the authorization in the Internet userauthorizer, nor distinguishes between violations "without
authorization" or "exceeding authorized access."
2.

Accepting the Ninth Circuit.

Instead, the clearer and more straightforward approach to
the distinction between "without authorization" and "exceeding
authorized access," supported by the Ninth Circuit in Brekka
and Nosal, should be extended to the Internet services context.
In those cases, the Ninth Circuit suggested that an authorized
user who utilizes his access beyond the limits of his
authorization has "exceed[ed] authorized access," while a user
who has no permission to access a computer system or whose
authorization to access a computer system has been expressly
revoked has acted "without authorization."148 This approach is
appropriate, particularly in the non-employment context,
because it is consistent with the CFAA's original purpose-to
combat technical computer hacking.149 It also preserves the
distinction between the two scienter requirements by respecting
the original inside user versus outside user understanding of
those requirements. 5 0 Indeed, in the Internet services context,
See notes 61-68, 94-115 and accompanying text.
HR Rep No 98-894, 98th Cong, 2d Sess 1984 (1984), reprinted in 1984 USCCAN
3689. See also Kerr, 94 Minn L Rev at 1561 (cited in note 12); notes 23-24 and
accompanying text.
150 S Rep No 104-357 at 6, 21 (cited in note 50). See also notes 50-51, 112 and
accompanying text.
148
149
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this interpretation will result in liability under the CFAA's
"without authorization" provisions only in the traditional
situations of hacking into a computer to which a user does not
have authorization by such means as using code to get past
protections intended to keep unauthorized users out or
improperly using another's password.
Under the Ninth Circuit's approach, an Internet services
user would be liable if, before receiving authorization to access
the service or after any such authorization has been clearly
rescinded, he uses technical computer knowledge to access the
service's data. For example, if a networking website requires
users to register before accessing content and a user finds a way
to access the content without registering or to continue accessing
the content after his registration has been revoked, the user has
accessed information "without authorization." Similarly, if one
registered and authorized user of an Internet service uses
another user's password and account to access the service, the
first user has accessed information "without authorization"
because he was never received permission to access the service
as another user. At first glance, this interpretation in the nonemployment context might seem overly broad, since a user
might easily access protected information by mistake. The
CFAA, however, limits liability to users who "knowingly" or
"intentionally" access a computer."15 Thus, individuals who
unintentionally stumble upon access to information that is
protected by some form of registration will not be penalized.
B. Meaning of "Exceeds Authorized Access"
The second step in determining the applicability of the
CFAA in the non-employment context is to understand what the
phrase "exceeds authorized access" means.
The Seventh Circuit's approach in Citrin can be rejected for
this purpose because, as discussed above in relation to the first
step in the analysis, it relies on common law agency principles
that are irrelevant in the Internet services context. Likewise,
the intended use analysis employed by the Fifth and Eleventh
circuits (in John and Rodriguez, respectively) is inappropriate
because it also presumes a certain relationship between the

18 USC § 1030(a)(1), (2), (4).

633] CFAA's APPLICABILITY TO INTERNET SERVICE CONTEXT 661
authorizing party and the authorized user. 152 In the Internet
services context, however, the user is not expected to understand
the provider's interests; such interest could easily be unknown
to an everyday user of Internet services. Indeed, because "public
website provider[s] can easily spell out explicitly what is
forbidden," 153 there is no reason to infer limitations on an
Internet services user's authorized access solely from the
authorizing party's interests or purpose. As a result, the
intended use analysis is unsuitable in the non-employment
context because there is no basis in the Internet service context
for defining authorization, or its scope, on the understood
relationship between an Internet user and authorizer.
Finally, both the Citrin approach and the intended use
analysis are suspect-in the CFAA context as a whole-because
they are inconsistent with the CFAA's language. As previously
mentioned, the Citrin court's approach to defining "without
authorization" collapses the two-scienter based requirements of
the CFAA into one, which is inconsistent with the express
language of the CFAA. 154 Furthermore, contrary to the intended
use approach adopted by the Fifth and Eleventh circuits, the
language of the CFAA conditions liability solely on the type of
access used by an individual to acquire data and not on the use
of the data acquired.15 5 For example, § 1030(a)(2), under which
the employee in John was prosecuted,1 56 states "[w]hoever ...
intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or
exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains [certain types of
information] . . . shall be punished." 15 7 As the language makes

clear, the accesser's liability under the CFAA only depends on
his access to the information being "without authorization," or
"exceeding authorization," without any regards or mention of the
use to which the accessed information is put.

152
153

See notes 72-88 and accompanying text.
EF Cultural Travel, 318 F3d at 63.

15 See text accompanying notes 56-60, 148.
"ss See generally, 18 USC § 1030.
156

John, 597 F3d at 270.

157

18 USC §1030(a)(2).
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Void for Vagueness?

Lastly, despite the notable challenges, the void for
vagueness doctrine does not operate to completely invalidate the
CFAA outside of the employment context. In Drew, the court
dismissed a CFAA charge on the basis of a Terms of Service
violation because, it its view, applying the CFAA to such a broad
context would render the Act void for vagueness for the lack of
adequate notice to users and the lack of guidance for law
enforcement.158 Professor Orin Kerr, who served as co-counsel in
the Drew case, proposed and supports this outcome. 159 In his
subsequent article, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act, 16 0 Professor Kerr argues that courts and
attorneys should continue to use the constitutional vagueness
doctrine to preclude the applicability of the CFAA to cases, such
as Drew, involving consumer violations of Terms of Service. 161
However, as the rest of this Comment will make clear, the void
for vagueness doctrine does not limit the CFAA to the
employment context. On the contrary, the CFAA can, in a
manner consistent with the void for vagueness doctrine, apply to
the Internet service context and, more specifically, to cases such
as Drew.
First, the Supreme Court's interpretation and application of
the void for vagueness doctrine counsels against invalidating the
CFAA on such a basis. In the recent decision in Holder v
HumanitarianLaw Project,162 the Supreme Court affirmed that
a scienter requirement in a statute can counter allegations that
the statute is void because it fails to put the public on notice of
what conduct is prohibited. 163 In that case, the Court ruled that
a criminal statute "requiring knowledge of [a] foreign group's
designation as a terrorist organization or the group's
commission of terrorist acts" gave sufficient notice to save the

15s

See text accompanying notes 128-135.

19

See Drew, 259 FRD at 451.

'60

Kerr, 94 Minn L Rev at 1582-83 (cited in note 12).
Id at 1572-73.

161
162

130 S Ct 2705 (2010).

'ss See id at 2720 ("[The knowledge requirement of the statute further reduces any
potential for vagueness[.]"). See also Village of Hoffman Estates v Flipside, Hoffman
Estates, Inc, 455 US 489, 499 (1982) ("[Al scienter requirement may mitigate a law's
vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to the complainant that his
conduct is proscribed.").
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statute from invalidation on vagueness grounds. 164 By analogy,
the CFAA's scienter requirements-the criminalization of only
knowing or intentional access that is "without authorization" or
that "exceeds authorization"-are sufficient to alleviate the
notice deficiency perceived by the court in Drew because they
adequately put the public on notice that certain misuses of
computers are criminalized by the CFAA.165
Second, the Supreme Court has also recognized the need for
preserving congressional intent when considering whether
statutes should be invalidated for vagueness.16 6 For example,
the Court recently reiterated that courts must be cautious before
striking an entire criminal statute for impermissible vagueness
and must instead "consider whether the statute is amenable to a
limiting construction" that restricts criminalization to actions
Congress clearly meant to penalize. 167 If a limiting construction
is possible in order to render the statute in question
constitutionally precise, courts should opt to apply such limiting
principles and preserve the statute rather than invalidate it on
vagueness grounds and completely eschew the congressional
intent underlying its enactment. 168 The circuit courts have
undertaken precisely this exercise by developing definitions of
"without authorization" and "exceeds authorized access." Those

HumanitarianLaw Project, 130 S Ct at 2719-20.
Although the Drew court conceded that scienter requirements can save a statute
from vagueness challenges, it concluded that the word intentionally in the relevant
CFAA provision did not qualify as a scienter requirement because it required only a
"conscious violation of a website's Terms of Service." Drew, 259 FRD at 467. In so
finding, the Drew court distinguished prior Ninth Circuit precedent holding that the
word intentionally in the CFAA satisfied the scienter requirement because the inclusion
of that word meant that the CFAA did "not criminalize otherwise innocent conduct. ..
[and required] the Government [to] prove that the defendant intentionally accessed a
[computer]" in violation of one of the authorization provisions. Id at 467, quoting United
States v Sablan, 92 F3d 865, 869 (9th Cir 1996). However, in attempting to distinguish
that Ninth Circuit precedent, the Drew court focused on factual differences between the
two cases and failed to explain how the meaning of intentionally was fact-specific. See
Drew, 259 FRD at 467. Thus, the Drew court's opinion does not represent strong
precedent for holding that intentionally is an unsatisfactory scienter requirement.
Moreover, the Drew court that other portions of the CFAA-including the felony
violation of 18 USC § 1030(a)(2)-have adequate scienter requirements. See id at 467 n
31.
166 See, for example, Philbrook v Glodgett, 421 US 707, 713 (1975) ("Our objective in
a case [expounding a statute] is to ascertain the congressional intent and give effect to
the legislative will.").
167
Skilling v United States, 130 S Ct 2896, 2905 (2010).
16
Id.
164
165
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limiting principles can be adapted for and extended to the
Internet services context.1 6 9
Third, arguments that the CFAA does not sufficiently put
the public on notice that criminal liability can arise out of a
contractual agreement1 7 0 are shortsighted and incomplete. While
it is true that while the CFAA does not by its actual language
condition liability on the violation of a contractual agreement,
the CFAA is clear that liability is based on the limits imposed by
the authorizing party.17 1 As this Comment and the very
language of the CFAA highlight, CFAA liability rests on
whether the accesser's conduct "exceeds authorization" or is
"without authorization." Correspondingly, liability based on the
limits of authorization requires an authorizing party to dictate
the terms of authorization. Consistent with CFAA employment
context cases, the terms of authorization can properly be
communicated and enforced through contractual agreementsl 72
even in the Internet service context.
Accordingly, the CFAA is not rendered void for vagueness
outside of the employment context for several reasons: its
scienter requirements adequately put the public on notice of
what computer misuses may violate the CFAA; a limiting
construction of the CFAA in the Internet service context can
render the statute sufficiently precise to overcome constitutional
vagueness challenges; and CFAA liability predicated on a
contractual agreement is not inapposite to the language of the
statute.
In conclusion, the CFAA is applicable outside of the
employment context to the Internet services context consistent
with the demarcations underlined in this Part. First, the
distinction between "without authorization" and "exceeds
authorization" must be coherently upheld as it was in the Ninth
Circuit's holding in Brekka and Nosal.173 Second, an accesser's

169 For a discussion of possible limiting principles in the non-employment context,
see Part V.
170 This argument was embraced by the court in Drew, which took
issue with the fact

that the CFAA was not explicit that liability could attach to a contractual relationship.
Drew, 259 FRD at 464.
' See generally 18 USC §1030 (creating CFAA liability for conduct that "exceeds
authorized access" or is "without authorization").
172 See, for example, Citrin, notes 56-59 and accompanying text, and John and
Rodriguez, notes 78-88 and accompanying text.
'a

See Part IV.A.
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liability under the "exceeds authorization" provision of the
CFAA must be defined by reference to the limits of authorization
and not to the use for which the accessed information is
employed.174 Third, in addition to the CFAA's scienter
requirements, limiting principles can preserve the CFAA in the
Internet service context and overcome constitutional vagueness
challenges.175
V. PROPOSED LIMITS ON THE

CFAA IN THE

INTERNET SERVICE

CONTEXT
As Part IV demonstrated, the CFAA should be interpreted
in a manner that maintains an actual difference between the
and
"without
of
"exceeding
authorization"
meaning
authorization." The current circuit split as to the meaning of
"exceeding authorization" can also be resolved to shed some
clarity on CFAA liability by rejecting intended use analysis and
the Seventh's Circuit application of duty of loyalty principles.
Lastly, Part IV argued that if proper limiting principles can be
applied to the CFAA, then the CFAA is not void for vagueness in
the online consumer context. This Part provides examples of
limiting principles that can be imported into the CFAA in the
membership-required, online networking context and in other
Internet services contexts. Specifically, this Part will propose a
number of limitations that can be utilized by courts and
prosecutors in the non-employment context.
A.

Limiting the Meaning of Access

Outside of the employment context, the term access in the
CFAA should not be interpreted in a way that considers the
defendant's use of the access or use of the information obtained
through such access. Instead, the term access should be
construed to refer to the accesser's violative breach of a
restricting barrier that precedes and enables his obtainment of
information. This construction is consistent with both the
language of the CFAA and the Ninth Circuit's approach in
Brekka and Nosal,176 and it obviates the need for an accesser to
understand and advance the authorizer's objectives.
1
175
176

See Part IV.B.
See Part IV.C.
See notes 99-115 and accompanying text.
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In passing the CFAA, Congress was primarily concerned
with combatting computer hacking."'7 To effectuate that
purpose, Congress chose to criminalize certain access to
computers.17 8 That is, instead of criminalizing the use of hacked
information or the use of hacked access-which it could have
done-Congress criminalized the access itself. Yet any
understanding of access that considers the use to which such
access is put fails to respect that congressional choice. This
limitation is particularly relevant in the non-employment
context where consumers of Internet services have no
reasonable means of discovering the uses of information an
authorizer permits or supports, nor have a preexisting
relationship with the authorizer from which to glean the norms
of authorization.
B.

Applying the Limiting Meaning of Access to the "Without
Authorization" Context

Because the CFAA's language focuses on a defendant's
access rather than use to which the defendant puts such access,
courts and prosecutors should use the CFAA's "without
authorization" provision in the Internet services context to
combat traditional computer hacking-clandestine access to
websites or data warehouses that restrict access to authorized
users only. For example, a consumer user should be liable for
accessing a computer system "without authorization" if he
knowingly bypasses a website's registration system in order
access the website's information, content, or functionality. A
consumer user should also be liable for access "without
authorization" if the he continues to access a computer system
after he becomes aware that his authorization has been revoked.
This second situation could arise when a consumer user is
removed from a social networking site for improper use but his

"' Counterfeit Access Act of 1984, 98 Stat 2190. See also HR Rep No 98-894, 98th
Cong, 2d Sess 1984 (1984), reprinted in 1984 USCCAN 3689; notes 20-27.
8 See 18 USC § 1030(a)(1), (2), (4) (referring to accessing a "computer" "without
authorization" or "exceeding authorized access"). See also Kristopher Accardi, Comment,
Is Violating an Internet Service Providers' Terms of Service an Example of Computer
Fraud and Abuse? An Analytical Look at the Computer Fraudand Abuse Act, Lori Drew's
Conviction and Cyberbullying, 37 W State U L Rev 67, 77 (2009) (explaining that
Congress was prompted to enact the CFAA to "protect[ ] property interestsL] ... citizens'
privacy[,] and national security").
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access credentials are not immediately deactivated
impedes their deactivation. 17 9
C.

or he

Applying the Limiting Meaning of Access to the "Exceeding
Authorized Access" Context

In the "exceeding authorized access" context, the correct
interpretation of access implies that consumer users of online
networking services should only be liable in two circumstances.
The first is hacking outside of the parameters of authorization.
Specifically, a consumer user who becomes a registered member
of an online networking site but then uses his membership to
access portions of the website that he is not meant to access
should be liable. For example, one who registers for Facebook
and then, while making use of his access to the profiles of others,
contravenes barriers to view information on those other profiles
that has been deliberately concealed from the public's view,
would be liable for exceeding his authorized access to Facebook.
To avoid vagueness concerns, the consumer user must be on
notice as to what portions of a website he is not meant to access.
However, such notice can be implied from the website's use of
technical obstacles such as additional password protection for
unauthorized areas or can be given via explicit language
warning that advancing to a certain area of the website exceeds
authorization.
The second type of "exceeding authorized access" liability for
consumer users in the online networking service context is when
an agreement between the user and the authorizing party
clearly delineates the limits of such user's authorization and the
user breaches that agreement. This agreement will very likely
take the form of a Terms of Service agreement, which should
meet certain criteria in order to avoid vagueness concerns. Many
of the criteria suggested below draw on concepts already utilized
in the clickwrap context-licensing agreements "in which the
vendor requires the consumer to click an 'I Accept' icon or click179 In effect, this was precisely one of the allegations in
the Aaron Swartz case. As
Orin Kerr described in a recent blog post, Swartz used JSTOR, a password protected
database, to download articles. Once his access was blocked, he repeatedly used other
methods to circumvent the blocks. Such actions are not "particularly different from . . .
quintessential [examples of] access without authorization." Orin Kerr, The Criminal
Charges Against Aaron Swartz (Part 1: The Law) (Volokh Conspiracy Jan 14, 2013),
online at http://www.volokh.com/2013/01/14/aaron-swartz-charges/ (visited Sept 15,
2013).
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check an unchecked box for the agreement to take effect" 180
because clickwrap agreements are similar in function to Terms
of Service Agreements and because they are predicated on a
similar relationship between vendors-consumers as the
relationship between
website
authorizers-website
users.
Furthermore, since several courts have already addressed and
elucidated
the
parameters
of
enforceable
clickwrap
1
8
1
agreements,
it is more likely that applying these parameters
to the Terms of Service context will persuade courts to also
enforce Terms of Service agreements.
First, these agreements should be obvious and apparent to
the user and should require affirmative assent. 182 Unlike in the
Drew case, in which the defendant was able to accept the Terms
of Service without accessing or viewing them, access-limiting
agreements should be presented to the user, in full form, at the
time the user accepts the terms. Of course, there is always the
concern that even if agreements are prominently displayed and
unavoidable by users, consumers will nevertheless ignore them
and assent without reading them.18 3 This concern is significantly
more important in the CFAA context than in the traditional
clickwrap context since CFAA violations can result in criminal
liability. Nevertheless, it has long been a tenet of criminal law
that ignorance of the law is no excuse and where the defendant
has the "possibility of knowledge" the law will be enforced
18o Ryan J. Casamiquela, ContractualAssent and Enforceability in Cyberspace, 17
Berkeley Tech L J 475, 476 (2002).
"s See, for example, Specht v Netscape Communications Corp, 306 F3d 17, 20-21 (2d
Cir 2002) (finding that users did not "unambiguously manifest assent" to a licensing
agreement when they downloaded free software without knowledge that downloading
the software would indicate assent to terms that would not be apparent to a "reasonably
prudent Internet user"); Caspi v Microsoft Network LLC, 323 NJ Super 118, 125-26
(1999) (upholding the enforceability of an online agreement that gave users ample
opportunity to review before affirmatively assenting to the agreement by clicking an "I
Agree" button).
182 See Casamiquela, 17 Berkeley Tech L J at 486 & n
97 (cited in note 180)
(explaining that the requirements of enforceable clickwrap is that the agreement be
automatically presented to the consumer and that it require the consumer to
affirmatively assent to its terms). See also ProCD v Zeidenberg, 86 F3d 1447, 1452 (7th
Cir 1996) (emphasizing that the software "splashed the agreement on the screen" so that
the consumer could not avoid it).
"
See Victor Luckerson, New Site Grades Those Pesky "Terms of Service"
Agreements You Never Read, Time (Aug 10, 2012), online at http://business.time.com/
2012/08/10/new-site-grades-those-pesky-terms-of-service-agreements-you-never-read/
(visited Sept 15, 2013) (noting that "the average Internet user encounters almost 1,500
privacy policies a year, each about 2,500 words in length" and that many users do not
bother to read the terms of those policies).
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against him.184 Additionally, even in the void for vagueness
context, at least one Supreme Court justice has affirmed this
concept explaining that "[n]o constitutional value is served by
permitting persons who have avoided any possibility of
attempting to ascertain how they may comply with a law to
claim that their studied ignorance demonstrates that the law is
impermissibly vague."18 5 Therefore, where users deliberately
ignore the terms and assent to agreements that are
conspicuously presented for their review, such ignorance should
not preclude CFAA liability.
Second, only the portions of these agreements that deal with
access restrictions should be enforced via the CFAA. Use
restrictions appearing in these agreements should not be
enforced under the CFAA's criminal or civil provisions. 86 This
requirement respects the proper interpretation of access
discussed above.' 8 7 In addition to disallowing contractual use
restrictions in Terms of Service agreements from being enforced
through CFAA liability, the CFAA's requirement that
unauthorized or excessive access cause "loss or damage" in order
for liability to attach18 8 further ensures that website providers
are not able to criminalize harmless violations of access
limitations. Accordingly, even if a user did exceed his authorized
access, he would nevertheless not be liable under the CFAA if
his access did not cause "loss or damage."
Third, the terms of the agreement that give rise to
authorized or excessive access charges should not be subject to
unilateral modification by the authorizing party without notice
to the user.1 89 Although a website provider should be permitted
to change the terms of a Terms of Service agreement without

Arnold v United States, 13 US 104, 118 (1815).
Hynes v Mayor and Counsel of Borough of Oradell, 425 US 610, 636 (1976)
(Rehnquist dissenting).
186
In other words, a Terms of Service provision prohibiting a user from accessing
information to which he does not properly have the password to would be enforceable
under the CFAA, while a provision prohibiting a user from using information for
financial gain would not be enforceable under the CFAA because it would amount to an
inappropriate contractual use restriction.
187 See Part V.A.
18s 18 USC § 1030(g).
'

185

189 See Douglas v United States District Court for the Central Districtof Cal, 495 F3d
1062, 1066 (9th Cir 2007) (finding that a party cannot unilaterally change the terms of
an online contract without the other party's consent since a "revised contract is merely
an offer and does not bind the parties until it is accepted").
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negotiating with the user, the user must be notified of, and
given the option to accept or deny, any changes to terms that
limit authorized access if the website provider wants to be able
to enforce those limits through CFAA liability. This restriction
militates against as-applied vagueness challenges to the CFAA
because previously permissible access will not suddenly be made
criminal without the user's knowledge.
Fourth, the information from Terms of Service agreements
that pertains to access limitations should be presented to the
user in a prominent manner; for example, with a heading and
colorful highlighting that informs the user that the provision
could potentially give rise to civil or criminal liability.1 90 Such a
warning suggests to the user that portion of the agreement
should be read closely. 19 1 Accordingly, void for vagueness
concerns would be further alleviated by this requirement
because adequate notice to the user would be magnified through
the prominence of the text.
These four limitations on the use of Terms of Service
agreements as bases for CFAA liability go a long way towards
meeting the void for vagueness challenges raised against the
CFAA in the Internet services context. Indeed, by using these
limitations to answer the vagueness challenges, courts and
prosecutors can constitutionally extend CFAA liability beyond
the employment context without worrying about invalidation
under the void for vagueness doctrine. This is important because
extending the CFAA to the non-employment context is
consistent with Congress' purpose in enacting the CFAA: to
address all instances of computer hacking.192 Additionally,
maintaining the CFAA to impose liability for certain breaches of
access in the Internet service context will make the Internet
safer for all consumers, especially at a time when users are
increasingly placing their private information online. 193

19 Juliet M. Moringiello and William L. Reynolds, Survey of the Law of Cyberspace:
Electronic Contracting Cases 2007-2008, 64 Bus Law 199, 216-17 (2008) (suggesting
that highlighting, bolding, and capitalizing important language would satisfy
conspicuousness requirements and help support the validity of an online contract).
191 Id.

192 See Part I, notes 20-27 and accompanying text.

Chris Rose, The Security Implications of Ubiquitous Social Media, 15 Intl J of
Management & Information Systems 35, 37 (2011) (describing an increase in "oversharing whereby people disclose too much information").
19s
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If these changes are incorporated into the current Terms of
Service regime, there could potentially be a chilling effect on
consumers' use of websites requiring registration. However,
because consumers in the Internet context quickly adapt to
changing norms, 194 any such chilling effect will likely be
temporary. In addition, because the portions of Terms of Service
agreements dealing with CFAA liability are likely to be
substantially similar across websites, 195 consumers will quickly
become accustomed to such terms, further ensuring that any
such chilling effect is only temporary. Lastly, a minor chilling
effect might even be desirable when weighed against the
activities that CFAA liability in the Internet services context
will deter.
VI. CONCLUSION

The CFAA was enacted to combat computer hacking at a
time when personal computers were scarce, little was known
about the potential of hacking, and the Internet was in its
infancy. Since then, much of the expounding of the CFAA has
taken place in the employment context and uncertainty about its
exact meaning persists. This obscurity is especially evident in
the continuing conflict between the application of "without
authorization" and "exceeding authorization," as well as the
ongoing struggle to define "exceeding authorization."
Against this dissonant backdrop, the added challenge of the
increased prevalence of Internet services and online networking
websites that often dictate consumers' assent to complex Terms
of Service agreements, fortifies the uncertainty of the CFAA.
Nevertheless, the approaches used by courts in applying the
CFAA to the employment context are often unavailing in the
Internet service context. Additionally, recent cases such as Drew
and Aaron Swartz's prosecution evince that there are conflicting

See id (noting that increased comfort with using the Internet has led many
consumers to conform to new norms, going from reluctance to even disclose one's name
on the Internet to comfort that often leads users to over-share information).
19s If the limitations on Terms of Service agreements
suggested in this Comment,
and others, are adopted by website providers and used as bases for CFAA liability, their
enforceability in the CFAA context will eventually be litigated. As litigation highlights
language that makes Terms of Service agreements enforceable under the CFAA, website
providers will strive to use that exact language because of the assurance that such
language will allow them to bring successful suits for CFAA violations. Accordingly,
there will be a significant amount of uniformity among different website providers.
194
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conceptions of the applicability of the CFAA to the Internet
service context: both a desire to apply the CFAA and to
challenge its applicability outside of the employment context.
Despite these complications, maintaining the CFAA and
determining its applicability to the Internet service context is
central to maintaining the congressional intent that underscored
the passage of the CFAA and making Internet user safer for all
consumers. This Comment emphasizes the applicability of the
CFAA to the Internet service context by embracing a coherent
distinction between "without authorization" and "exceeding
authorization" based on whether the user has any access
privileges to the computer or information network in question.
Furthermore, it incorporates a definition of "exceeding
authorization" that gives no regard to the use to which
improperly accessed information is put, and focuses instead on
the practical limitations to access as expressed through
technical blocks and contractual agreements between website
providers and website users. Lastly, this Comment proposes
limitations to the types of agreements between consumers and
website providers that will support the imposition of CFAA
liability to ensure that the Act will withstand constitutional void
for vagueness challenges even when applied to Terms of Service
violations, as it was in the Drew case. Together, these
approaches suggest a comprehensive approach to holding
Internet users responsible for CFAA violations in the Internet
service context.

